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ABSTRACT 
This article critically reviews recent developments in the administrative justice system, 
in particular it considers three key themes: improving initial decisions; administrative 
review; and the future of tribunals. In each of these areas, some aspects of 
administrative justice work well, but austerity has presented acute challenges in 
ensuring the fair and just treatment of people through restrictions upon legal aid; the 
withdrawal of some appeal rights; and the expansion of administrative review. 
Consequently, the system is moving away IURPDµOHJDO¶PRGHORIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFH
to the µEXUHDXFUDWLF UDWLRQDOLW\¶ PRGHO, which focuses upon accurate and efficient 
implementation. However, the reality does not correspond with the goals of the model. 
Rather than accurate and efficient implementation of policy, what we find is poor 
decision-making made by junior officials with insufficient quality controls. Digitising 
tribunals may have potential benefits in terms of increased accessibility. Nonetheless, 
the prospects for administrative justice are weak. 
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Administrative justice 
 
µAdministrative justice¶ may not be as familiar as µcriminal justice¶ or µcivil justice¶, but it is 
just as important. It concerns both the making of administrative decisions and the systems for 
challenging such decisions. 7KH µV\VWHP¶ LV FRPSOH[ DQG IUDJPHQWHG DQG FRPSULVHG RI
YDULRXV VSHFLILF V\VWHPV WKDW GLYLGH DORQJ µYHUWLFDO¶ SROLF\IXQFWLRQV OLQHV, such as: 
immigration, social security, tax, criminal injuries compensation, and many more. There are 
also µKRUL]RQWDO¶ cross-cutting different redress mechanisms, including: complaint and 
ombuds procedures; internal administrative review processes; tribunal appeals; and judicial 
review. 
 The scale of the system is huge. In just the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
alone, around 12 million social security decisions per year are made. Only a proportion of 
refusal decisions are challenged through mandatory reconsideration (around 300,000 per 
year) and tribunal appeals (around 150,000 per year). HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) 
makes millions of tax decisions per year. In terms of redress mechanisms, there are 34,000 
administrative reviews per year and 7,000 tribunal appeals. The Home Office makes around 3 
million immigration decisions per year. Some 95% of decisions are grants, that is, in 
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DSSOLFDQWV¶IDYRXU6RPH% of decisions are refusals. Only a proportion of these decisions 
are challenged through the following remedies: administrative review (some 6,000 per year); 
tribunal appeals (50,000 per year) and judicial review (16,000 per year). Other public bodies, 
such as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, make fewer decisions, but the 
decisions ± for instance, concerning entitlement to compensation for a victim of a violent 
crime - are nonetheless important. Administrative justice is a large and unwieldly area. It is 
also always on the move. The system never settles down. Policy and administrative changes 
often prompt changes in both initial decision-making processes and structures and also 
redress mechanisms. 
When examining administrative justice, the perspective from which issues are 
approached and understood is vital. Broadly speaking, two general approaches are key: a 
governmental and a legal perspective, though there are various gradations along this spectrum 
(Galligan, 1996). From a governmental perspective, the focus is naturally upon the entire 
volume of cases presented to government that then require decisions. There is also a focus 
upon providing adequate redress within the limits of available resources and what is 
considered to be timely and proportionate. Processing the overall volume raises issues such 
as: timeliness, cost-efficiency, administrative organisation, the effective management of staff 
in addition to the need for good quality decisions. 
By contrast, a legal perspective on administrative justice focuses upon justice and 
fairness in the individual case. The need to ensure justice and the effective redress of 
grievances is essential. From this perspective, justice considerations naturally predominate 
over resource and system-wide considerations. Both governmental and legal approaches to 
administrative justice have their strengths and weaknesses. Lawyers tend to view a court-
based model as the ideal standard and have difficulty in conceptualising the administrative 
process as a legitimate justice system in its own right. By contrast, a governmental 
perspective focuses largely upon the timely and cost-effective wholesale processing of a vast 
caseload and may sometimes view adjudication ± as opposed to administration - as a costly 
and time-consuming task. This difference of perspective is both inevitable and explains much 
of the debate in administrative justice. At the same time, the tension is largely irresolvable. 
Accordingly, the practical workings of administrative justice involve a whole range of 
compromises and trade-offs. 
 In light of the various changes to administrative justice, it is now an opportune 
moment to survey the field and to provide an overall stock-take of how administrative justice 
institutions are currently operating. By drawing upon our interactions with government 
departments, we aim to contribute to the wider conversation by highlighting both the 
challenges for delivering administrative justice and possible areas for improvement (Thomas 
and Tomlinson, 2016). We consider the work of administrative justice in terms of initial 
decision-making by government departments and other public bodies, administrative review 
of those decisions, and the work of tribunals, in particular the digitisation of tribunals through 
the introduction of online dispute resolution.  
 
Initial administrative decision-making 
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The task of getting initial administrative decisions right first time is widely recognised. Good 
initial decisions mean better implementation of policy, fewer challenges and therefore 
reduced cost on redress mechanisms. This means better service for claimants and less stress 
and anxiety. It also means enhanced public confidence in government (AJTC, 2011; Thomas, 
2015).  
Yet, there are widespread concerns that, in practice, front-line decisions are frequently 
of substandard quality. Concerns have repeatedly been raised with the standard of initial 
decisions in areas such as social security and immigration thereby strongly suggesting that 
little, if any, progress has been made in improving quality (e.g. Independent Chief Inspector 
of Borders and Immigration, 2016). Such decisions are of fundamental importance to the 
individuals concerned in terms of being awarded their legal entitlements, for instance, to 
social security, immigration status and other public services. Poor decisions have a profound 
impact upon people in terms of their well-being, happiness, finances, and family lives. People 
wrongly refused social security are subject to social exclusion and acute personal hardship. 
Immigrants wrongly refused are often unfairly separated from their family, suffer severe 
uncertainty and financial hardship and, in asylum cases, can be returned to their home 
country to face persecution and torture. 
 There are many reasons why initial decisions are often of poor quality. Low-level and 
poorly trained staff have to make sensitive and difficult decisions quickly. Legal rules and 
policies are often impenetrably complex and change frequently. Organisational cultures to 
meet performance targets and key performance indicators often replace the core task of 
taking good decisions (anonymous, 2017). There can be a constant challenge between 
working with operational undercurrents whilst trying to maintain and develop a depth of 
expertise within a department. For instance, in the Department for Work and Pensions, the 
size of the number of decision-makers and the turnover in that cadre of people is massive. 
There are also wider political forces at work that can feed down and influence initial 
decision-makers, especially when dealing with classes of people perceived by the state as 
µXQGHVLUDEOH¶- social security claimants, immigrants, and asylum claimants. 
 The ability of people to appeal negative decisions to tribunals provides one measure 
of the variable quality of decisions. As Figure 1 shows, tribunals allow some 30-47% of 
appeals. Tribunal outcomes are not necessarily a perfect measure of the quality of initial 
decisions. Tribunals can arrive at a different decision if new evidence is submitted. 
Alternatively, tribunals may take a different view of the same evidence or relevant guidance 
might have changed between initial decision and appeal. Nonetheless, the rates of allowed 
appeals give a strong indication of part of what is happening. 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
There are structural and procedural reasons why tribunals both make better quality 
decisions and why they are well-placed to identify errors and mistakes at the initial decision-
making stage. More resources are put into the tribunal stage than initial decision-making. 
Initial decision-makers do not have a legal background. They are typically under pressure to 
make decisions quickly according to key performance indicators. Decision-makers work on 
the basis of interviews with claimants or evidence compiled from a claim form. By contrast, 
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tribunal hearings take place either with representation or the tribunal may adopt an 
inquisitorial approach. At oral hearings, the appellant can attend and be asked questions by 
the tribunal judge or panel. Furthermore, whereas both decision-makers and tribunals must 
give reasons, tribunals are aware that their decisions can be scrutinised before the Upper 
Tribunal. Despite these differences, the overwhelming bulk of decisions are taken at the 
initial stage and there are concerns as to the quality of decision-making±for instance, as to 
whether decision-makers properly weigh up and evaluate the evidence and correctly apply 
guidance and the law. 
Government departments themselves are aware that initial decision-making is often of 
variable quality. Yet, in practice, initial decision-makers rarely appreciate the impact of their 
mistakes and poor decisions on individuals and their families. Opportunities for government 
to improve are regularly missed (PHSO, 2016). Furthermore, austerity has vastly accentuated 
the problems. The resources of government departments have been significantly reduced. At 
the same time, legal aid restrictions, the expansion of administrative review and the 
withdrawal of some appeal rights have weakened redress mechanisms (Palmer et al 2016). 
 
Improving initial decisions 
All of this presents a massive challenge to government, and to the public in terms of its 
expectations of government. The predominant focus of government upon processing the great 
mass of cases quickly means that the more fine-grained approach required for contested 
decisions will normally be side-lined. But, at the same time, are there things that public 
authorities can do to try to replicate aspects of the evidence-gathering role that tribunals 
undertake without shifting entirely toward a tribunal model? 
The quality of decisions rests in part upon an implicit choice concerning the amount 
of resources put into the initial decision-making process. An initial decision-making process 
that is not sufficiently well-resourced to produce uniformly high-quality decisions will 
necessarily have knock-on implications downstream for the individuals concerned, external 
redress mechanisms, and how government then responds to these challenges. Part of this 
must be the recognition within government that some initial decisions will be wrong and that 
there needs to be a consequent focus upon quality assurance and organisational learning. 
While government departments recognise the scale of the challenge and have put 
mechanisms and processes in place, they are very much at the foothills in terms of improving 
decision-making. Government departments are under pressure to focus upon throughput and 
processing the overall volume of decisions. Operational pressures can vary. For instance, a 
particular area of decision-making might suddenly increase thereby requiring the re-
allocation of case-workers and resources to meet that need. The issue also touches upon the 
thinking and approach within government. For instance, the DWP has a cultural tradition of 
focusing upon appeals and appeals strategy but relatively little focus on initial decision-
making. Yet, appeals are all about re-working decisions already taken. Accordingly, it is 
important for senior managers of decision-making teams to become more focused upon the 
quality of primary decisions. 
 One issue here concerns the position of the unit within the government department or 
public authority that plays the role of encouraging better decision-making. In the DWP, the 
Feedback and Decision-making Unit seeks to influence senior managers of decision-making 
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teams to focus on the quality of initial decisions. In HM Revenue & Customs, responsibility 
for litigation and improving decision-making was previously fragmented throughout a 
number of different units with different systems in place. Over time, this work has been 
EURXJKW WRJHWKHU LQWR +05&¶V 6ROLFLWRUV 2IILFH ZKLFK KDV VRPH  SHRSOH DQG QRZ KDV
more clout with HMRC to inform and change the behaviours of decision-makers and to 
improve the quality of decision-making. The Solicitors Office does this by reviewing cases as 
to whether they should proceed to a tribunal. There is also a dispute resolution team that 
visits HMRC offices to identify key issues to enhance decision-making. This is supported by 
local quality champions within decision-making teams that then take things further. Such 
feedback mechanisms are designed to improve decisions and to ensure that only the right 
cases are taken forward to tribunals. Looking forward, +05&¶V Solicitors Office wants to 
use its data to inform future training of decision-makers. It is also looking at how complaints 
and appeals can work more closely, how to resolve cases, and problems that arise. Having all 
reviews and litigation in one unit has enhanced the prominence of the issue. 
 Another issue concerns administrative guidance issued by government departments to 
assist decision-makers. Some departments such as the Home Office are working on projects 
such as simplifying policy and the simplification of previously paper forms into digital 
format. The higher-level decision-making team in the DWP would receive requests from 
decision-makers about the application of guidance. The team was in effect trying to improve 
decision-making one issue at a time to one decision-maker at a time, which would take a long 
time to make a difference. The team then changed its approach to promoting its guidance and 
helping people to use it and encouraging operational areas to take ownership for this area of 
learning. Rather than answering specific requests, the team now adopts the approach that it is 
better to send the matter back through the management chain in order to identify whether the 
issue is with one decision-maker or a team which can be resolved through additional training 
and support. The intention is that moving to a more systematic approach in order to identify 
key widespread issues across decision-making teams, that is, to reduce the number of 
individual requests concerning guidance, but to raise the overall quality of decision-making. 
 
Government learning and quality assurance 
Government departments have also made some efforts to learn from tribunals in order to 
improve initial decision-making. For instance, the DWP ran a pilot on feedback by which 
tribunals identified the key reason why they allowed an appeal, which was then relayed to 
decision-makers (DWP, 2012). Decision-makers have found this feedback to be helpful. The 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority has occasional meetings with tribunal members 
about tribunal outcomes. Tribunals occasionally produce GHVLJQDWHG µEHQFKPDUN¶ RU
µJXLGDQFH¶GHFLVLRQV.  
Yet, there are concerns as to whether government is fully investing itself in the 
learning process. There are practical challenges of seeking to draw out general lessons from a 
large number of tribunal decisions ± e.g. 70,000 immigration appeals and 150,000 social 
security appeals per year ± can present a challenge. There are also challenges around the 
timely delivery of feedback to the right person within the organisation. Timely feedback is 
most helpful. Third, to be effective, tribunal feedback needs to be consistent. Inconsistent 
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approaches by different tribunal judges can make it difficult to work out specifically what 
message the tribunal is trying to give to the government department concerned.  
There are different types of feedback and different considerations will apply. Tribunal 
IHHGEDFNWHQGVWREHTXLWHµOHJDO¶ and is delivered by way of formal tribunal decisions on the 
outcome of specific appeals. By comparison, reports of an oversight body²such as the Chief 
Inspector of Borders and Immigration and the Social Security Advisory Committee²are 
focused on key themes and contain clear recommendations to which the government 
departments concerned must respond. First-tier tribunals themselves are also not immune 
from making errors. Further, the appeal process itself may itself affect the substance of 
tribunal decision-making. For instance, in the two largest tribunal jurisdictions ± social 
security and immigration ± appellants who opt for oral hearings tend to experience higher 
success rates than appellants whose appeals are determined on the papers (see Figure 2). 
Issues concerning the quality and efficiency of decision-making also arise in relation to 
tribunals. Arguably, government departments could benefit from more direct dialogue with 
tribunals. However, this raises sensitive issues given the need for separation between 
government and tribunals and the need to maintain the perception of the judicial 
independence of the tribunal. One option is for tribunals to hold open forums for such 
discussions. 
 
(Figure 2) 
 
Such issues are not necessarily insuperable. A fundamental issue is the willingness 
and readiness of government departments to embrace the challenge of learning and whether 
WKH\DUHLQµDOHDUQLQJSODFH¶Organisational learning concerns the ability of an organisation 
to learn collectively by applying new knowledge to the policy process or innovation in policy 
implementation and embedding those lessons into routines that guide future action (Thomas, 
2015). Organisational learning is closely connected with feedback and improving initial 
decisions. There is partly an issue of systems and structures, but it is crucially a cultural issue 
about the nature and mindset of the government organisation itself. For instance, the Home 
2IILFHFODLPVWRWDNHDFFRXQWRIIHHGEDFNIURPWULEXQDOV<HWWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VEHKDYLRXU
points entirely the other way as evidenced by its practice of routinely challenging its defeats 
in the First-tier Tribunal decisions regardless of criticism from the Upper Tribunal (See, e.g., 
VV v Secretary of State for the Home Department (grounds of appeal) Lithuania [2016] 
UKUT 00053 (IAC)). Despite successful legal challenges, the Home Office has continued to 
engage in unfair and unlawful action thereby strongly suggest that political and organisational 
forces trump organisational learning (ILPA, 2017). The proportion of asylum appeals allowed 
increased from 22% in 2007 to 41% in 2016. 
 Arguably, decision-making could also be enhanced if it became a more 
professionalised role within government. Presently, there are 25 civil service professions, 
including policy, operational delivery, various corporate functions and more specialist ones 
(such as medicine, law or planning). However, decision-making is not formally recognised as 
a civil service profession. Instead, it is includeG ZLWKLQ WKH JHQHUDO UXEULF RI µoperational 
delivery¶. There are strong arguments for professionalising decision making as a discrete 
professional career with its own skills and responsibilities. These include: knowledge of the 
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law, regulations, and policy; interacting with the public; collecting information evidence; 
assessing that evidence; making appropriate findings; applying the law; giving reasons; 
reviewing decisions; defending appeals before tribunals. Sometimes these tasks can be 
relatively routine. Sometimes they can be quite difficult and nuanced tasks ± for instance, the 
assessment of medical evidence and the giving of effective reasons. To some extent, this is 
already the case in relation to tax professionals who work at HMRC. Nonetheless, greater 
professionalisation of decision-making could raise both its standing and the quality of 
decision-making and make this task part of a recognised career and profession. Arguably, 
there is a gap in the current overall professional structure of the civil service. Another way of 
looking at the issue is to consider whether there is sufficient investment in decision-making. 
It is important to consider decision-making in terms of training, remuneration, competences, 
communication skills, the value placed upon decision-making and the emotional intelligence 
UHTXLUHGZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHLPSDFWRIVXFKGHFLVLRQVRQSHRSOH¶VOLves. 
Another option would be for government to make greater use of quality assurance 
systems to check decisions irrespective of whether or not individuals decide to challenge 
them. A quality assurance process works by setting standards for the quality of decisions and 
then assessing a sample of decisions against those standards. One basic principle of the 
administrative justice process is that individuals must consciously choose to challenge 
decisions. A choice to challenge decisions depends upon various factors such as: knowledge 
of the law; knowledge of appeal or redress procedure; and a willingness to challenge. It may 
be the case that in some parts of the administrative justice system there is a suppressed 
premise that some of the decisions may not be very good at all, but that people will appeal 
and that the judges will rectify any errors. A major problem with any such assumption, 
however, is that many people do not challenge decisions. Research has found that many 
factors influence the decision to challenge and these factors are often unrelated to the quality 
of the initial decision (Cowan and Halliday, 2003). 
Consider Employment and Support Allowance claims. Between October 2013 and 
December 2015, there were 974,230 Work Capability Assessments completed; 128,790 
mandatory reconsiderations registered and 28,580 appeals completed. In other words, just 
under 3% of initial decisions resulted in an appeal (DWP, 2016). It is impossible to know 
with any degree of certainty the implications of this ± for instance, how many people who do 
not challenge decisions might succeed if they did so. At the same time, it has been argued 
that µthe total volume of injustice is likely to be much greater among those who accept initial 
decisions than among those who complain or appeal¶ (Ison, 1999, 23). 
One mechanism widely used in the private sector for ensuring good standard products 
is to have quality assurance systems. Arguably, quality assurance is a more effective way of 
ensuring good quality initial decisions than relying upon tribunals (Mashaw, 1974). Tribunals 
depend entirely on whether individuals decide to appeal. By contrast, quality assurance 
systems apply to both positive and negative decisions irrespective of whether someone 
challenges a decision. Some public bodies operate quality assurance systems to varying 
degrees. For instance, the Home Office developed a quality assurance system with the 
UNHCR for asylum decisions. DWP decision-makers will each have a couple of decisions 
checked each year by experienced decision-makers and provided with feedback. Government 
bodies can also either check decisions before they are sent out or after an appeal has been 
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lodged (UK Visas and Immigration, 2016). 7KH +RPH 2IILFH XVHV D µVHFRQG SDLU RI H\HV¶
(SPOE) approach for some types of asylum decision. There are strong arguments that 
government bodies either consider operating a quality assurance system or, if they do so 
already, enhance such systems. There may be scope for sharing cross-government learning 
and thinking on this issue. 
 
Administrative culture and a judicial approach 
A linked issue concerns decision-making culture and the approach and ethos adopted. This 
may seem nebulous, but it is also of wider importance in terms of how decision-making is 
undertaken. One argument is that adopting a µjudicial approach¶ can raise enhance the quality 
of decision-making. A judicial attitude of mind implies a particular approach to the 
evaluation of evidence and the taking of decisions. It can be applied even though the 
institutional context involved is not a judicial one. It does not necessarily require all the 
apparatus of judicial decision-making. It can be and sometimes is used within government. 
Consider two types of decision-making. Decision-making can be either rule-based and 
mechanical or evaluative and judgmental±or a mixture of both. Rule-based decision-making 
requires only relatively straightforward administrative processing and fact-finding. For 
instance, does a migrant have the specified amount of money in their bank account? By 
contrast, evaluative and judgmental decisions often involve the careful assessment of 
competing pieces of evidence and then a reasoned evaluation. Such decisions are best taken 
through a judicial or adjudicative attitude of mind. 
A judicial approach has the following features (Robson, 1952). First, impartiality of 
mind, that is, not just following the first impression of the case (confirmation bias). Second, 
adopting a reasoned and careful approach to fact-finding and the assessment of the evidence. 
A judicial approach signals the difference between the automatic acceptance or rejection of 
certain types of evidence as compared with the careful weighing of evidence and providing 
reasons why it is to be accepted or rejected. Third, there is the need to treat like cases alike 
and to reason not according to rules, but by principles. Reasons should be proper, adequate, 
and intelligible, and deal with the substantial points that have been raised (Re Poyser and 
0LOOV¶$UELWUDWLRQ [1964] 2 QB 467, 478, per Megaw J. See also South Bucks District Council 
v Porter [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953). Reason-giving is SDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWµQRW
only in persuading those who are affected by the decision that it is a just and reasonable one 
but also in developing WKHPHQWDOFDSDFLW\DQGVHQVHRIIDLUQHVVRIWKHDGMXGLFDWRU¶ (Robson, 
1952). A judicial approach indicates, for instance, the difference between an administrative 
review decision that simply repeats the initial reasons for refusal and one that engages in a 
thorough review of the case. It also highlights the difference between using standard 
paragraphs and carefully crafted reasons. 
It has been argued that in social security there was formerly a culture and ethos of 
adjudication±as evidenced in the role of the former Chief Adjudication Officer ±but that this 
has been displaced by administration and a culture of processing claims (Warren, 2006). A 
focus on processing a high caseload with limited resources inevitably inclines toward 
administration rather than adjudication. The low-level of attendance by presenting officers at 
tribunal hearings is also a factor. Generally, the DWP recognises that the ability to analyse 
evidence forensically through mandatory reconsideration is critical. For instance, a decision-
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maker who sees new additional evidence and considered the matter within the department 
might have stuck with her initial decision, but having seen how the tribunal questioned the 
evidence and placed it in context, the decision-maker could see how why the tribunal allowed 
the appeal. 
There is always the risk that a judicial approach may give way to a more rigid 
processing approach. For instance, decision-makers may seek guidance so that decision-
making becomes more of a tick-box exercise, a request that higher-level managers resist. 
Political pressures may also incline toward a particular style of decision-making. Culturally, 
in the DWP there can be an adversarial approach in which decision-makers whose decisions 
have been overturned by the First-tier Tribunal would like to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In 
practice, WKH ':3¶V )HHGEDFN DQG 'HFLVLRQ-making Unit turns down many such requests 
from decision-makers because there is no error of law. The team then provides feedback to 
decision-making teams as to why the First-WLHU7ULEXQDO¶VGHFLVLRQVFDQQRWEHFKDOOHQJHG 
Given that tribunals engage in adjudication, there is a case for greater understanding 
of such an approach between government, tribunals, and representative bodies which also 
ensures judicial independence. HMRC officials have noted this has assisted their 
understanding of adjudication (Thomas and Tomlinson, 2016). This parallels previous 
research which found that the experience of appearing regularly before tribunals profoundly 
affected the approach of decision-makers to adjudication: they took greater care in the 
making of decisions, but also adopted an entirely different, more judicial, philosophy (Young 
and Wikeley, 1992). Through exposure to tribunal, decision-makers can come, over time, to 
realise the desirability of collecting sufficient evidence, of weighing that evidence objectively 
and of applying the relevant law impartially (Young and Wikeley, 1992). It is arguably now 
more important for decision-makers to have greater exposure to tribunals given that the 
increasing prominence of administrative review will, to some extent, eclipse the role of 
tribunals. This may also enable greater understanding as to how government departments can 
achieve the same level of skill and questioning in administrative review that is equivalent to 
the probing of evidence in tribunals. That is, just the submission of new evidence alone is 
important, but so is the approach adopted to the assessment of that evidence. The answer may 
be adopting a more judicial approach to assessing evidence. 
Overall, improving initial decision-making is an issue involving many layers of 
complexity, layers which have to be understood in view of the constraints facing government. 
While not widely publicised, government departments are taking various steps to improve, 
but much more needs to be done. Internal structures could be organised more effectively, 
public authorities could do more to learn from tribunal feedback, quality assurance systems 
could be introduced and extended, processes could be establish to build a culture of 
organisational learning, there could be greater professionalisation of decision-making, and 
efforts could be made to promote a more judicial approach within decision-making. 
 
Administrative review 
 
Administrative review is the process by which an individual whose claim or application that 
has been refused applies to the relevant public authority for a review of that decision. It is 
µadministrative¶ in the sense that the government department or public body will review its 
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own decision ± for instance, to identify any case-working error or to consider additional 
evidence submitted by the individual. Administrative review has increasingly been 
introduced as either an intermediate stage in the dispute process before going to a tribunal or 
as a substitute for tribunals. 
A clear and prominent example of this can be found in the social security context, 
where claimants must now first seek mandatory reconsideration before being able to appeal 
to a tribunal. The reconsideration process was introduced to resolve disputes as early as 
possible, reduce unnecessary demand on tribunals, and encourage claimants to provide 
additional evidence. Following the introduction of mandatory reconsideration in 2013, the 
Department for Work and Pensions has undertaken around 483,000 mandatory 
reconsiderations (353,900 Personal Independence Payment MRs and 128,790 Employment 
and Support Allowance MRs). Figure 3 shows the volume of mandatory reconsiderations. 
The introduction of mandatory reconsideration in 2013 coincided with a reduction in the 
number of social security appeals heard by tribunals, though there may have been other 
factors contributing to this reduction. 
 
(Figure 3) 
 
In the immigration context, administrative review was introduced following the 
withdrawal of various appeal rights under the Immigration Act 2014. Between October 2014 
and September 2016, there 7,329 in-country administrative review applications received 
(Home Office, 2017). The Home Office is unable to provide data on out of country and 
detained administrative reviews. Administrative review is also widely used in other areas, 
including: tax; homelessness; criminal injuries compensation; and freedom of information 
requests. 
The arguments for administrative review is that it is quicker, cheaper, and more 
efficient for correcting errors than tribunal appeals. A mandatory reconsideration costs 
£79.59 compared with £592 for a tribunal appeal (DWP, 2015; HMCTS, 2015). From the 
user-perspective, simply going back to the government department to provide additional 
evidence or to identify a case-working error is quicker, easier and less complicated than 
lodging a legal appeal to a tribunal. Arguably, users benefit from a quick review of a decision 
rather than experiencing the delays and anxiety associated with tribunals. The median 
monthly clearance times for mandatory reconsiderations for Employment and Support 
Allowance claims have been around nine calendar days since February 2015 (DWP, 2016). 
By comparison, the average time clearance of social security appeals over the period April to 
June 2016 was 17 weeks (MoJ, 2017). As regards immigration administrative reviews, the 
average amount of time taken has been 15.2 days (Home Office, 2016b). By contrast, 
immigration tribunals have become particularly prone to long delays over recent years, with 
the average appeal now taking 45 weeks to be decided (MoJ, 2017). 
 
Administrative review in practice 
But, there are significant downsides with administrative review. The low quality of review 
decisions mean that reviews may, in practice, amount to little more than DµUXEEHU-VWDPSLQJ¶
exercise. $GPLQLVWUDWLYH UHYLHZ LV µmarkedly less favourable¶ WKDQDQDSSHDO R (Akturk) v 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC Admin 297, [71]). Appeals are 
decided by an independent judicial body through fair procedures, typically oral hearings. 
Reviews are decided by an official and decided on the papers. Whereas appeals involve the 
tribunal substituting its own decision, reviews are typically limited to considering whether the 
initial decision was incorrect. The compulsory nature of administrative review discourage 
many people from pursuing their case to a tribunal. A third concern is that the abolition of 
appeal rights and replacement by administrative review ± as has happened in immigration ± 
will not only curtail remedies against and oversight of government, but will make the Home 
Office judge in its own cause. The insertion of administrative review tends to weaken tribunal 
appeals. 
The variable quality of review decision-making has been highlighted in independent 
reports. As regards immigration administrative reviews, the Chief Inspector of Borders and 
Immigration has found that while levels of accuracy and consistency varied reviews 
undertaken in-country, overseas and at the border, µoverall there was significant room for 
improvement in respect of the effectiveness of administrative review in identifying and 
FRUUHFWLQJFDVHZRUNLQJHUURUVDQGLQFRPPXQLFDWLQJGHFLVLRQVWRDSSOLFDQWV¶,QGHSHQGHQW
Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2016). Reviews were being undertaken by low-
level and untrained staff. Quality assurance of reviews was minimal and ineffectual. Valid 
applications had been incorrectly rejected and this had not been picked up. The review 
system failed to identify some case-working errors. Success rates were lower than expected ± 
far lower than previously successful appeals. Despite assurances that the Home Office would 
establish feedback mechanisms to ensure that lessons are learnt by caseworkers, in practice, 
there was no systematic feedback to some original decision-makers or to reviewers and so 
organisational learning was at best patchy. In response, the Home Office accepted the 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DQG UHFRJQLVHG WKDW µTXDOLW\ KDV QRW FRQVLVWHQWO\ EHHQ RI WKH VWDQGDUG WR
ZKLFKZHDVSLUH¶DQGDFFHSWHGWKHQHed for improvements (Home Office, 2016a). 
As regards social security, the Social Security Advisory Committee has reported that 
Mandatory Reconsideration has not been working as well as it should and has made detailed 
recommendations (Social Security Advisory Committee, 2016). A number of points arise. 
One issue is whether it is realistic to assess the standard of administrative review decision-
making against that of tribunals. Administrative review is not a more formal legal process 
with the parties acting as litigants. Instead, it is an essentially administrative process of 
checking and, if necessary, correcting decisions already taken. Unlike tribunals, 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHUHYLHZLVQRWDMXGLFLDOSURFHHGLQJ,WLVDµFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\QRQ-SDUWLFLSDWRU\¶
process (Sainsbury, 1994). There are no hearings. Another issue concerns the appropriate 
balance between speed and quality of decision-PDNLQJ7KH':3¶VDELOLW\ LQ -XO\ WR
process some 13,200 mandatory reconsideration decisions within an average of nine days 
raises questions over the quality of such decision-making. Government departments accept 
that they may not have found the best equilibrium here. 
Another key difference is that while legal and evidential concepts concerning the 
handling and assessment of evidence is deeply embedded within the culture and ethos of 
tribunals, they appear to be largely alien to administrative reviewers. For instance, a familiar 
criticism of mandatory reconsideration is that reviewers habitually afford more weight to 
medical UHSRUWV SURGXFHG E\ WKH ':3¶V FRQWUDFWHG-out health care professionals, such as 
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ATOS and Capita and routinely disregard other types of medical evidence (Gray, 2017). This 
is all the more alarming given that the quality of such health care reports has been repeatedly 
criticised and tribunals consider such reports as only one item of evidence to be considered 
alongside other medical evidence (Warren et al, 2014). 
The substantial disparities in review and appeal raise particular concerns about the 
quality of review decisions. Over 45% of immigration appeals are allowed compared with 
only 18% of administrative reviews (MoJ, 2017; Home Office, 2017). As regards social 
security, the differences between reviews and appeals have become more pronounced over 
time. As Figure 4 shows, the proportion of allowed appeals has increased substantially from 
40% in 2013 to 65% in 2017 whereas the proportion of allowed mandatory reconsiderations 
have decreased from 35% in 2013 to 17% in 2017. Overall, the average mean of allowed 
mandatory reconsiderations has been 20% compared with a mean average of allowed appeals 
of 53%. The headline rate of allowed social security appeals has been seen as a failure of 
poor initial decisions and also a failure of the mandatory reconsideration process to filter out 
those cases likely to be overturned by tribunals. 
 
(Figure 4) 
 
Enhancing the quality of administrative review processes 
A cross-cutting issue with administrative review is how to achieve the same level of skill and 
questioning in administrative review equivalent to the probing of evidence by tribunals. For 
instance, DWP decision-PDNHUVUHO\RQWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VVWDQGDUGLVHGSrocesses for gathering 
evidence through claim forms and guidance. By contrast, tribunal judges and panel members 
question claimants in person at hearings to provide a context to which the existing and 
additional evidence can be interpreted. This point is related to the purpose and approach 
taken toward administrative review. Is it a de novo re-assessment or does the reviewer 
approach the task with a presumption that the original decisions stands unless something has 
plainly gone wrong or new evidence prompts an entirely different view? A related issue is 
how government departments operating administrative review systems can learn from 
tribunals as regards the collection and interpretation of evidence through administrative 
review. Administrative review is not equivalent to an appeal in terms of its procedures and 
independence, but to achieve its benefits, administrative review systems need to be able to 
resolve disputes more effectively. This is likely to involve something approaching the same 
type of questioning undertaken in a tribunal hearing. There is scope for tribunal judges to 
provide training to administrative reviewers on how to gather evidence and interpret such 
evidence. 
 A second important concern is whether compulsory administrative review prior to an 
appeal may deter people likely to succeed in an appeal from pursuing their case to a tribunal. 
Claimant fatigue can mean that people who have sought a review are then reluctant to then 
appeal. In 2014, the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee recommended that 
there should monitoring of claimant behaviour to determine whether mandatory 
reconsideration was deterring people from pursuing appeals (House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee, 2013-14). On the other hand, it might be that the mandatory 
reconsideration process provides many claimants with a satisfactory and appropriate means 
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of reviewing their claim. To date, there has been little empirical inquiry into this issue. 
Behavioural change in relation to mandatory reconsideration²and indeed in relation to 
administrative justice issues more widely²is an area ripe for empirical enquiry. 
 A third issue is that many system-users may be unaware that they are moving from 
different institutions, i.e. from administrative review, to tribunals, and then possibly to the 
courts. These systems have different procedures and decision-making models, but they also 
occupy different positions. There is a continuing need to capture the perspective of users on 
administrative justice systems, and to build this into the design of systems and processes. 
)URPWKHXVHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHhow easy the system is to understand is vitally important. This 
may include providing users with sufficiently clear signposts as to avenues of redress, 
timescales, and procedures.  
 A fourth issue concerns the independence of the reviewers that undertake 
administrative reviews. It appears to be normal practice that reviewers are separate from 
initial decision-makers. In such instances (such as in-country immigration administrative 
reviews), the reviewers are functionally separate from initial decision-makers and are located 
in a separate unit within the same government department. Some reviewers (such as overseas 
immigration administrative reviewers) are not functionally separate from initial decision-
makers. However, the Chief Inspector for Borders and Immigration did not find any evidence 
of bias and also found that such reviewers were generally more thorough and effective than 
their in-country counterparts. There is only limited legal provision on this issue. The 
Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 require that 
local authority homelessness administrative reviews to be undertaken by µsomeone who was 
not involved in the original decision and who is senior to the officer who made the original 
decision¶ (The Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations SI 
1999/71, reg. 2). By contrast, the judicial independence of tribunal judges is protected by 
statute (Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, section 1). Furthermore, the Senior 
President of Tribunals has oversight of tribunals. It is arguable that the lack of independence 
of internal reviewers weakens the effectiveness of internal review as an administrative justice 
process. It may also weaken public confidence. Irrespective of structural separation or 
independence, an impartial state of mind may be a more important characteristic. To be 
undertaken effectively, internal reviewers must approach each claim with as few 
presumptions and biases as possible. There is a strong argument that internal reviews should 
normally be undertaken by a senior and more experienced officer. 
 A final issue to be recognised is the fragmented development and nature of 
administrative review, and the need for an overall perspective. Individual administrative 
review systems have been developed on an ad hoc basis by individual government 
departments. There are different models in place. In tax, there is a choice between appeal and 
internal review. In social security, someone must apply for mandatory reconsideration before 
an appeal. In immigration, administrative review has replaced many appeal rights. While 
there is a coherent set of procedure rules for tribunals and courts and general principles, there 
is no equivalent across internal review systems. Yet, far more disputes are now channelled 
through administrative review than other systems. There is scope for greater cross-
government communication and thinking concerning internal administrative review systems 
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and feedback. There is already a cross-government complaints network. This network could 
provide a basis for sharing of experience within government on internal review. 
 Administrative review could provide a good quality redress mechanism, but it does 
not currently appear to fulfil this promise. On the contrary, it tends in practice to weaken 
administrative justice. To enhance the potential of administrative review, government needs 
to learn appropriate lessons from how tribunals collect and handle evidence. Given the 
growth of administrative review, there is a need for better understanding of how 
administrative review systems operate in practice and to obtain a better understanding of the 
views of users. 
 
Moving tribunals online 
 
Over recent years, tribunals have been affected by a range of different changes: legal aid 
restrictions; appeal fees; court closures; and resource pressures. There have been concerns 
that access to justice has been hindered. The Ministry of Justice and HMCTS are currently 
undertaking one of the largest and most ambitious justice reform programmes ever attempted. 
A key part of this is Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): moving court and tribunal processes 
online so that users can interact more flexibly with litigants (Susskind, 2013). 
 Online methods have been used for some time by the Traffic Penalty Tribunal. This 
system is based on the principles of transparency; proportionality; accessibility; velocity; and 
finality. Appeals and evidence are submitted and managed online. All the parties consider the 
evidence put up online and comment upon it. The messaging system enables adjudicators to 
adopt an online inquisitorial approach. This makes the process quicker and efficient than 
normal paper-based systems. There is also a facility for people who are not online. Putting 
most appeals online has released administrative support for those who cannot appeal online. 
Telephone assistance is available. The online system has reduced costs for local authorities. 
There are no papers or bundles. Local authorities used to spend two hours to half a day 
preparing a case; they now take 20-30 minutes. The costs for local authorities of processing a 
case has dropped from £200 to £40. The system has also enabled local authorities to review 
their decisions and concede untenable decisions. It has enabled easier and more effective 
communication between the parties. It has also reduced costs and time taken to conclude 
appeals. Overall, the online system has worked well for the Traffic Penalty Tribunal. The 
question is whether this model can be applied to other systems. 
 In 2016, the Ministry of Justice published its strategy Transforming Our Justice 
System (MoJ, 2016). The strategy document provides the general outline, but it is 
intentionally general in nature. The reform is based upon the principle of proportionate and 
accessible justice. The aim is to deliver quick and certain justice by: offering different ways 
of resolving disputes; stripping out unnecessary procedure and costs; communicating with 
users so they know what to expect and do; allowing judiciary to focus on matters of law; and 
using physical hearings only where necessary. As regards tribunals, this will involve: 
digitising the whole claims process; delegating routine tasks from judges to HMCTS 
caseworkers to free up judicial time; tailoring tribunal panels to the needs of individual cases; 
and removing unnecessary restrictions on how a dispute may be determined. The system will 
need to be accessible so that people can use it without a lawyer. There will not be a 
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presumption that all cases will automatically go to a hearing. The online process should 
enable the parties to arrive at the point of difference more quickly and efficiently. 
 The 0LQLVWU\ RI -XVWLFH LQWHQGV WR GHYHORS µDVVLVWHG GLJLWDO¶ SURFHVVHV WR SURYLGH
support to those who are unable to appeal online. The reform has been developed in 
SDUWQHUVKLSZLWKWKHMXGLFLDU\DQGLVXQGHUSLQQHGE\WKH6HQLRU3UHVLGHQWRI7ULEXQDOV¶YLVLRn 
of one system; one judiciary; and quality assured outcomes. The Ministry of Justice has not 
laid down a timeframe, but it is envisaged that implementation will take four to six years. It 
will be a long-WHUPSURJUDPPHUDWKHUWKDQDµELJEDQJ¶ 
 The new online process is to be rolled-out on a phased basis commencing with the 
socials security and child support tribunals (the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement 
Chamber). It is to be based upon user research to identify user needs in each tribunal. The 
Tribunal will have to take measures to help people who are not online, to ensure that they are 
in a dialogue with the judge. Another benefit of online appeals is that some appellants find 
going a tribunal and an oral hearing to be a very stressful experience. The online system may 
also be easier for representatives. It might also reduce the 17% adjournment rate, which often 
happens because not all of the evidence has been submitted and assembled for the oral 
hearing. Also, feedback from tribunals to the initial decision-maker will be immediate and 
obvious. 
 Given problems with previous public sector IT projects, the Ministry of Justice is not 
introducing ODR through a µbig-bang¶ wholesale change. Instead, it is adopting a gradual 
phased implementation. There are a whole host of questions as to how the new system will 
work in practice and how it will cater for people without online access: are there some types 
of cases that would not be appropriate for ODR? If so, which types of cases? And how would 
those cases be identified ± through a blanket policy or on a case by case basis? What 
DSSURDFK ZLOO EH WDNHQ ZKHQ FDVHV UDLVHV LVVXHV RI WKH DSSHOODQW¶V FUHGLELOLW\" :KDW ZLOO
happen with online appeals? How will ODR benefit users? Will the gains of using ODR 
offset the disadvantages? How will digitally assistance work in practice? What assistance will 
be available? How will it be possible to know whether an appellant appealing online is the 
person they say they are? 
 The core challenge here is to re-design and improve the delivery of justice from an 
established µNLQHWLF¶ system that was devised on the basis that legal representation would 
normally be available to an online system where such representation is no longer normally 
available. Furthermore, given the broader financial context, the system is under intense 
pressure to provide efficiency savings. The restoration of legal aid funding is extremely 
unlikely. New ways by which users can navigate the system without representation and 
lawyers need designing. On the other hand, representation and funding will be required for an 
assisted digital scheme. It is difficult to imagine that the pro bono sector alone could fill this 
gap. 
 It is important that implementation is informed by research, consultation, and piloting. 
HMCTS is undertaking behavioural insight research into the user-experience. One theme 
from this work has been that many users do not distinguish between the decision-making 
department and the tribunal, as there seems to be little difference between what happens in 
one place and what happens in the other place. There is also a lack of clear, simple guidance 
about the process. The task of designing the new online system will include the need to have 
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clear signposting. There will also be a need for tribunals to change the way they engage with 
users. Looking forward, it is important that research be undertaken into how the new system 
operates in practice. It is vital to understand the behaviours and motivations of tribunal users 
and whether these might be affected by an online system. For instance, disability advocates 
have suggested that the move from oral hearings to online appeals could result in fewer 
appeals being upheld (Ryan, 2016). It is will be essential to undertake detailed empirical 
research into how moving appeals online works in practice and, particularly, how this change 
may affect substantive tribunal decision-making.  
 Overall, the Ministry of Justice's Transforming Justice plan envisages a radical reform 
of the tribunals systems. Such reforms hold great potential in improving efficiency and access 
to justice. At the same time, they also raise a range of possible challenges. The promise of the 
digitisation reform programme is to enhance the accessibility of tribunals by more user-
friendly online methods. It therefore has potential benefits. But, currently little is known as to 
how ODR will work in practice. 
 
Administrative justice theory and reality 
$FFRUGLQJWR0DVKDZ¶V well-known theory, there are three different models for organising an 
administrative justice decision process: the bureaucratic rationality model; the professional 
treatment model; and the moral judgment model (Mashaw, 1983; Adler 2003). The main 
features of these models are set out in Table 1²each model having different legitimating 
values, primary goals, organisational structures, and cognitive techniques. 
 
(Table 1) 
 
 Each model represents a different normative model as to how administrative justice 
ought to be organised. The bureaucratic rationality model focuses upon the efficient and 
effective administration of policy. Decision-making on this model involves collecting and 
processing information and is legitimated by its pursuit of implementing, precisely, 
established social objects in a resource-sensitive manner. The moral judgment model 
(otherwise known as the legal model) focuses upon adjudication rather than administration. 
Under this model, an individual is asserting her legal rights. Administrative justice is not 
concerned with implementing policy, but with legality and dispute-resolution. The ideal type 
of dispute resolution is to have an independent judge hearing a case through fair procedures. 
This model is reflected in the work of courts and tribunals. These two models reflect the 
WUDGLWLRQDOGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ µDGPLQLVWUDWLYH¶ DQG µOHJDO¶approaches. The aim of the third 
model, the professional treatment model, is for a professional (e.g. a doctor or social worker) 
to serve their client. This model can be seen in the use of experts supplying evidence and 
expertise to courts and tribunals. It can also be seen in the members of certain tribunals (e.g. 
some social security tribunal panels) which incorporate expert non-legal members and also 
those who give expert evidence. 
 
The reality of the µQHZEXUHDXFUDWLFUDWLRQDOLW\¶PRGHO 
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The developments discussed above can be analysed through the frame of administrative 
justice theory, but the reality of administrative justice also challenges theory. Prior to the 
great financial crisis of 2007-08, the legal model was in the ascendant as reflected by the 
reforms introduced by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the increasing 
judicialisation of tribunals, and other reforms such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Since 
2010, austerity has been imposed and been reinforced by tougher policy priorities in areas 
such as social security and immigration. The effects upon administrative justice have been 
wide-ranging: severe reduction in legal aid, the abolition of some tribunal appeal rights, and 
the expansion of administrative review $FFRUGLQJ WR 0DVKDZ¶V DQDO\VLV WKH PRGHOV RI
administrative justice are competitive. The greater the prominence of one model, then the 
corresponding diminution of other models. The retreat of the legal model has then coincided 
with the advance of bureaucratic rationality. 
Yet, none of this implies that the promise of bureaucratic rationality ± accurate and 
efficient policy implementation ± will actually happen in reality. Indeed, much of the 
evidence concerning the operation of administrative decision-making in practice tends to 
undermine any assumption that government departments could ever emulate an ideal model 
of µbXUHDXFUDWLFUDWLRQDOLW\¶. Real-world bureaucracies do not conform to ideal types. On the 
contrary, the evidence suggests that the potential for government to deliver administrative 
justice has also been weakened. Front-line decision-making is of variable quality. In practice, 
initial decisions are taken by low-level officials under pressure to process decisions quickly 
with few quality controls. Overall, initial decision-making cultures are not sufficiently 
informed by norms and processes as to how best to collect and handle evidence, fair 
procedures, and reason-giving. Errors and mistakes occur relatively frequently. 
Administrative review largely operates as a process for confirming decisions already taken. 
Success rates are significantly lower than those of tribunals. Administrative review can also 
discourage people from going to tribunals. Procedural restrictions can have important 
substantive consequences by making it more difficult for people to secure their legal 
entitlements. 
Setting out a set of principles of administrative justice is relatively easy. Making 
administrative justice work effectively in practice is far more challenging as it presents a 
wide range of complex practical issues. There are inevitably constraints and limits on what 
can be achieved. There are also a number of trade-offs and comprises. Accordingly, the quest 
for administrative justice cannot be a search for perfect justice, but is instead concerned with 
finding the best within the limits of what is possible. Even before the full impact of austerity, 
there were significant concerns about the quality of administrative justice. Unsurprisingly, 
those concerns have been accentuated by restrictions upon legal aid, the abolition of some 
tribunal appeal rights, and the expansion of administrative review as a cheap and quick, but 
lower-quality method of dispute resolution. 
Looking to the future, it is possible there are ways that government could pursue to 
raise the quality of administrative justice and we have considered various options in this 
paper, such as enhanced feedback, quality control processes, organisational learning. It 
remains to be seen whether the digitisation of tribunals will improve access to justice. 
Nonetheless, all of this is said against the backdrop of ongoing austerity. Given this brute 
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fact, the acute challenges of achieving administrative justice are unlikely to diminish any time 
soon. 
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Figure 1: The proportion of allowed first-tier appeals 
 
Note: This figure shows the proportion of appeals allowed by the First-tier Tribunal against 
negative decisions concerning entitlement to social security, immigration, asylum, and 
criminal injury compensation (Ministry of Justice, 2016). 
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Figure 2: Oral and paper outcomes in social security and immigration appeals, 2010-14. 
 
Note: This figure shows the proportion of oral and paper appeals in first-tier social security 
and immigration appeals. The data was taken from the 1.7 million social security appeals 
determined over the years 2010-15 and the 428,000 immigration appeals determined over the 
years 2010-14 (HMCTS 2014 and 2016). 
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Figure 3: Mandatory reconsiderations, 2013-17 
Note: This figure shows the number of mandatory reconsiderations for employment and 
support allowance and personal independence payments decided and allowed by the 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2013-17 (DWP, 2017a and 2017b). 
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Figure 4: Mandatory reconsideration and tribunal appeal success rates, 2013-17 
Note: This figure compares the proportion of successful mandatory reconsiderations and 
social security tribunal appeals (DWP, 2017; MoJ, 2017). 
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